Post-human interaction design, yes, but cautiously by van Dijk, Jelle
  
Post-human interaction design, 
yes, but cautiously
 
Abstract 
Post-human design runs the risk of obscuring the fact 
that AI technology actually imports a Cartesian 
humanist logic, which subsequently influences how we 
design and conceive of so-called ‘smart’ or ‘intelligent’ 
objects. This leads to unwanted metaphorical 
attributions of human qualities to ‘smart objects’. 
Instead, starting from an ‘embodied sensemaking’ 
perspective, designers should demand of engineers to 
radically transform the very structure of AI technology, 
in order to truly support critical posthuman values of 
collectivity, relationality and community building. 
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Introduction 
It is a good thing that Interaction Design has embraced 
the post-human. For ages, humans have seen 
themselves as the epicenter of the world. Given the 
global challenges today, it seems long due we 
reconsider our proper place in the complex, 
interconnected eco-system that is planet earth. In 
design, this has lead to the recognition that ‘human-
centred design’ is in a way problematic, as it would 
suggest that design is for the benefit of humans only, in 
disregard of the interests of non-humans such as 
animals, or even rivers.  
But when design ‘beyond the human’ goes together 
with Artificial Intelligence (AI) there is a risk. The risk is 
that post-human design will not prevent, and may even 
obscure, the fact that AI technology itself imports a 
traditional, humanist form of logic, which subsequently 
influences how we design and conceive of so-called 
‘smart’ or ‘intelligent’ objects. In this provocation I 
elaborate this risk and offer an alternative frame, based 
on the enactivist notion of embodied sense-making. 
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Figure 1. Cartesian logic, 
embedded in AI technology. 
implicitly imported into post-
human smart objects Images 
© Jelle van Dijk  
FINAL DRAFT PREPRINT VERSION 
  
Starting with the view that human beings are embodied 
sense-makers, I argue that the ‘smart objects’ we 
design are not themselves ‘sense-makers’, they are at 
best part of our extended living bodies, through which 
we make sense. Smart objects remain things that 
humans think with’, not ‘thinking things’. An enactive 
embodied view allows us to throw away a lot of 
unwanted Humanist bathwater, while retaining a 
human – that is, an embodied, situated and ecologically 
sustainable human - baby. 
The rise of the smart object 
Smart algorithms used today were developed in the 
cognitive sciences in the 1980s and 1990s, yet it is only 
recently that we see their massive deployment in real-
world contexts. This is largely due to the explosion of 
available data. Thus we see a wealth of research on 
smart or intelligent objects, products, and systems, and 
a strong interest for AI in interaction design research. 
Several design-researchers in the area of smart, 
consumer-type artifacts now explicitly endorse a post-
human frame to re-conceptualize the human-
technology relations involved [1]. Yet somehow, this 
has led to the idea that the ‘smart objects’ that will be 
inhabiting our lives should be granted a status of 
autonomous sense-makers, such as we read in [2]: 
“the question then is how to design intuitive 
collaborations between humans and non-humans. … 
Considering intelligent products as agents 
acknowledges that they sense, respond, and cooperate 
in human activity in an autonomous manner.”  
Or as Ron Wakkary puts it: “By posthuman, I mean 
thinking about the world as if humans share center 
stage with non-humans ….things are made of matter 
that is vibrant and agentic such that they appear to 
have “a life of their own” and so relate to us more like 
companions than tools.”1 
My provocation is this: the idea that objects truly have 
a life of their own, that they ‘autonomously’ sense and 
cooperate with humans as companions, is false. It can 
be useful in a metaphorical sense, but note it is 
essentially a humanist conception of humans (as 
thinking agents, socially interacting with other agents, 
responding intelligently to the environment), applied to 
an artifact. The metaphor can also have negative 
ethical consequences, to which I turn later. Most 
importantly however, this metaphor is rooted deep into 
the very structure of AI itself, and instead of building 
on it, design should instead concern itself with getting 
rid of it once and for all. 
AI is Humanistic  
Imagine a hypothetical artificial neural network (ANN). 
Suppose the network takes as input pattern pixel 
values of a camera and, after training, reliably outputs 
1 when the camera image shows a person and 2 when 
it shows a cat. Imagine the AI module is used as a 
design part in a smart object moving around in a 
household. This little critter is designed to have certain 
appropriate responses cat, and others that apply to its 
human household members. Taking a post-human 
scenario, we can now research and analyse the 
activities in the household from the perspectives of the 
humans, the cat, and from the view of the artifact. 
                                                  
1 https://uwaterloo.ca/games-institute/events/guest-lecture-
things-we-could-design-more-human-centred, retr. 13/3/20. 
  
This sounds reasonable at first sight. However, note 
that the output of the neural network (cat, human) is 
already a human judgment, implemented by the 
designer, a human being, for whom cats and humans 
are sensible categories. We tend to say the network 
‘learned the distinction by itself’. But what really 
happens is that engineers implemented their categories 
of humans and cats using as a functional mechanism 
the property of ANNs being able to settle iteratively on 
statistical regularities in large sets of data. The goal 
states that the network trains on are human categories. 
Furthermore, the distinction (cat, human) is a human 
judgment. That is to say: the software in the system 
acts as a cognitive system: it models the outside world 
internally, and reaches a cognitive judgment, before it 
acts. We may talk about the critter as an ‘embodied’ 
agent, but in reality it is a physical machine, on the one 
hand, with a detached ‘mind’ in the form of its 
algorithms, on the other. If these two work well 
together, this is due to skilled craftsmanship of 
designers only. Any meaning we attribute to its 
behavior is grounded not ‘in its being’ but in our, 
human being: we humans, make sense of what the 
artifact is doing and we make sure the artifact is doing 
something that makes sense.  
Consider even the sensor. Sensors are material 
artifacts, crafted by humans, that transform physical 
qualities to a digital signal, say, a level between 0 and 
5 Volt. A sensor being active means representing the 
world: the exterior environment is measured and re-
presented as a digital ‘state’. This transformation turns 
everything that happens after into a process modeled 
on the Cartesian mind: the inner ‘cognitive’ system 
sensing what is ‘going on outside’, eventually, to 
control it. Moreover, the sensor is designed to sample 
some qualities and not others, with a preset resolution. 
Such engineering choices are ultimately grounded in 
human understanding of the world, not in any intrinsic 
understanding ‘by the artifact’. Interactive technology, 
especially when equipped with AI, does not generate a 
new ‘being’ living together with humans: it implements 
a rather traditional, Cartesian model of human 
cognition, represented in a crude mechanical 
simulacrum (See Figure 1). 
Embodied sense-making 
In biological organisms, what we call ‘sensors’ and 
‘neural processing’ are integrated aspects of living 
bodies, gradually evolved in interaction with ongoing, 
self-sustaining sense-making activity [3]. Nobody 
designed our sensors, and they did not come with 
prefab meaning. Our ‘sensors’ are so deeply interwoven 
with our action system that the distinction between 
‘sensor’ and ‘actuator’ falls short: we are living, sense-
making bodies, sensor and ‘motor’ at the same time. 
From an embodied sense-making perspective and in 
line with mediation theory [4] technologies are 
incorporated in our human sense-making practices, and 
our sense-making bodies become extended bodies. AI 
technology changes nothing to this basic scheme. 
However, AI itself is modeled on quite a different 
worldview: a rationalist, Cartesian, that is essentially 
Humanist conception of mind as standing over and 
against the world. Smart objects, even in post-human 
design are still tainted by these Humanist roots.  
Discussion 
It may feel natural and harmless to design objects as if 
they can hear, see, feel, and interact with us socially. 
But the illusion created by these metaphors may 
  
actually be harmful. Thus, we may be tempted to see 
Roomba the vacuumcleaner as a rudimentary “Sophia” 
– the famous humanoid, i.e. as a thinking social agent, 
some-one (not some-thing), able to ‘take a perspective’ 
and engage in social interactions with ‘other’ household 
members (most notably, of course, the cat). But we 
should better understand Roomba as not an 
independent household member, but rather as a 
sensorial extension of human embodied sense-making. 
Mind you, not of the household members themselves, 
but of the data scientists in the commercial companies 
that wish to observe and gather data from consumers. 
Roomba is not R2D2, but James Bond’s spy-camera, 
disguised as a ballpoint pen. 
Embodied sense-making radically changes the 
conception of ourselves as rational minds with physical 
bodies. Yet it also rejects the idea of interactive 
technologies as ‘also’ embodied sense-makers. This is 
not a move back into traditional ‘human centered’ 
design. It aligns with Braidotti’s ‘critical post-
humanism’, when she writes: “Posthuman subjectivity 
expresses an embodied and embedded and hence 
partial form of accountability, based on a strong sense 
of collectivity, relationality and hence community 
building.”[5] 
To use technologies for such community building is 
precisely what makes us more human, in contrast to 
the Humanist project that saw technology as a way to 
for Western colonists to eventually dominate the world. 
But this is far removed from giving any special status to 
smart objects. It is difficult to get rid of this fantasy of 
intelligence in machines, especially when designers 
take AI as a ready-made ‘module’, along with all 
narratives, to embed in their artifacts. It gets even 
worse when designers keep using metaphors for 
artifacts as ‘observing’, ‘understanding’, ‘desiring’, and 
so on, which are all essentially Cartesian, humanist, 
descriptions of human being. 
If used with care, agent metaphors can be very useful. 
Giaccardi developed an elegant ethnography of the 
thing: “movie clips [shot] from the perspective of our 
three objects, help[ed] explore what these objects 
‘experience’”. [6] To think ‘from’ the object’s 
perspective, metaphorically, may help create human 
value (in this case, people with dementia). However, 
interaction designers can actually go much further. 
They should start concerning themselves with criticizing 
the actual technical structure of AI. Based on their 
holistic, skilled designerly intuitions, and guided by a 
deep empathic involvement with real-world human 
practices, they should not just design metaphorical 
interfaces, but instead demand of AI engineers that 
their Cartesian mechanics need to be replaced by a 
form of interactive processing that truly supports the 
posthuman collectivity, relationality and community 
building advocated by Braidotti. 
Conclusion 
The position advocated here could be characterized as 
a cautious, critical form of post-humanism. It can also 
be taken as a ‘Humanism 2.0’ – arguing that our design 
concerns are still, in the end human concerns, even if 
being human means a fully embodied and situated in - 
and striving to live in harmony with - the larger eco-
system of animals and matter that makes up our 
planet. It may take a change not just in appearance but 
in deep structure of ‘smart’ objects to be able to fully 
cater such values. As a start, this paper hopefully helps 
  
design-researchers get clear on what is currently at 
stake in the design of interactive objects. 
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